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Compared with the efforts of Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century, 
the nations of northern Europe, including Scotland, were slow to engage in 
colonisation. Nonetheless, while the respective crowns and state authorities 
of northern Europe were too preoccupied both internally and in Europe to 
take any active interest in the New World, the sixteenth century did see a 
considerable growth in skills and concepts which would later become relevant 
to colonisation. Continued interest in the Newfoundland fishery — an 
important aspect of the economic life of France and England — brought 
about a closer and keener awareness of North America and of the possibilities 
of extended landings there, even on a temporary basis; and it provided pools 
of expertise and manpower that could be drawn upon for voyages not only 
of commerce but also of colonisation. The fishery, and later the fur trade, 
also built up a mercantile network which could provide a basis for financing 
colonisation. Further experience and expertise were provided, particularly 
in England, by privateering voyages directed against the Spanish in the West 
Indies and in South America. The same is true of efforts to find a north-
western passage to the Far East. While none of these activities had any 
necessary connection with colonisation as such, they added to the potential 
which existed in northern Europe. Once this potential was released by 
political stabilisation, colonising attempts would be the likely result. 
Since stabilisation in northern European nations occurred coincidentally, 
the first thirty years of the seventeenth century saw a proliferation of con-
flicting claims to those American lands which were considered promising and 
which were far enough removed from the still-awesome power of Spain. The 
first phase involved the claiming of vast tracts of American land defined by 
latitudes. The first definition of the French colony of Acadia came in 1603 
with a commission to Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts, as royal lieutenant-
general between the 40th and 46th degrees of latitude. Three years later, the 
English royal charter for colonisation of Virginia granted the territory be-
tween the latitudes of 38 and 45 degrees to a group of promoters centred in 
Plymouth, as "the second colony of Virginia"; by the New England charter 
of 1620, these limits were adjusted to the 40th and 48th parallels. In 1614, 
furthermore, the States-General of the Netherlands granted that area be-
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tween the latitudes of 40 and 45 degrees to a consolidated New Netherlands 
Company. 
It was into this confused situation that the colony of New Scotland was first 
projected in 1621. Scottish marine interests during the sixteenth century had 
continued in traditional patterns, established during three centuries of peace 
with continental European powers — a coastal fishery, and extensive trade 
with France, the Netherlands and the Baltic, as well as with England and 
Ireland. Nevertheless, even in the sixteenth century, there is evidence of 
some slight growth of interest in voyages to southern Europe and to New-
foundland.1 The union of the crowns in 1603 also made available to Scots, and 
particularly to those Scots who removed to England with the royal court, 
the legacy of English experience in voyages to America. Moreover, both 
Scottish and English crowns, co-ordinating their efforts after 1603, had 
promoted colonial projects in the Celtic areas of the respective realms: the 
English crown in Ireland, and the Scots crown in the Highlands and Islands. 
Such projects added greatly to the sum total of experience which was 
carried forward into the colonial endeavours of the seventeenth century.2 
Among the recipients of these legacies of experience was Sir William 
Alexander, a Scottish poet and minor landowner, whose literary accomplish-
ments were instrumental in obtaining the favour of James VI. Knighted in 
1609, at the approximate age of thirty-two, Alexander became a member of 
the Scots Privy Council in 1615 and thereafter served the Scots crown con-
tinuously until his death in 1640 in a variety of capacities.3 Early in his 
career in London, Alexander began to take an interest in colonial schemes 
in Newfoundland; and the quickened interest in colonisation after 1620 led 
him to consider colonisation as a means of advancing his own personal for-
tunes. Thus it was at Alexander's prompting that James VI wrote to the Scots 
Privy Council on 5 August 1621, noting that "sundry other kingdomes, as 
like wyse this our kingdome [England] of late, . . . have renued their names 
imposeing them thus upoun new lands", and instructing the Privy Council to 
1 See Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), pp. 247-50; 
Thomas N. Devine and S. G. E. Lythe, "The Economy of Scotland Under James VI: A Re-
vision Article", Scottish Historical Review, 50 (1971), pp. 100-5. 
2 On these colonising projects, see Gordon Donaldson, The Scots Overseas (London, 1966), 
ch. II; William Cook Mackenzie, History of the Outer Hebrides (Paisley, 1903), chs. VII, 
VIII, IX; George Hill, An Historical Account of the Plantation of Ulster at the Commence-
ment of the Seventeenth Century, 1608-1630 (Belfast, 1877); David Beers Quinn, The 
Elizabethans and the Irish (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966); Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English 
Colonization: From Ireland to America", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 30 (1973), 
pp. 575-98. 
3 Thomas H. McGrail, Sir William Alexander, First Earl of Stirling (Edinburgh, 1940); Daniel 
Cobb Harvey, "Sir William Alexander", in George W. Brown, ed., Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography thereafter cited as DCB] (Toronto, 1966), I, pp. 50-4. 
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prepare "a signatour under our great seale of the . . . lands betweene New 
England and Newfoundland . . to be holden of us [ by Sir William Alexander] 
from our kingdome of Scotland . . . ."4 
The lands in question lay south of the latitude of 48 degrees, and were thus 
technically within the New England patent of 1620. Indeed, Alexander had 
certainly received encouragement from the English colonial promoter Sir 
Ferdinando Gorges, and Gorges later wrote that the territory had been 
"assigned" by him to Alexander.5 As Alexander made clear, however, New 
Scotland was at no stage merely an English scheme under a Scottish figure-
head: "I shew them that my Countrymen would never adventure in such an 
Enterprize, unlesse it were as there was a New France, a New Spain and a 
New England, that they might likewise have a New Scotland".6 The royal 
charter, sealed on 29 September 1621, accordingly declared that New Scot-
land was to be held by Alexander from the Scots crown and joined to the 
realm of Scotland.7 The colony would have no formal connection with the 
kingdom of England. Alexander, for his part, emphasized the particular 
benefits which the colony could offer to Scotland. In addition to the general 
hopes for the honour and glory of empire, for an increase in trade and for 
the acquisition of strategic goods such as timber and naval stores, Alexander 
addressed himself to more specifically Scottish concerns. Scotland would at 
last be able to make productive use of that part of its population which had 
been accustomed to serve in foreign armies. Since it was generally agreed 
that Scotland had an abundance of labour, and with, as Alexander observed, 
"the necessities of Ireland . . . neere supplied", American colonisation could 
provide an eminently acceptable outlet.8 Such were the considerations em-
bodied in the royal letter of intent in August 1621 and renewed in a further 
letter to the Scots Privy Council from the new king, Charles I, in July 1625.9 
4 John Hill Burton, et ai, eds., The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (38 vols., Edin-
burgh, 1877-1970), ser. I, XII, p. 774. In this article, dates are normally rendered according 
to the Gregorian (New Style) calendar, which was in force in Scotland and France at this 
time, rather than according to the Julian (Old Style) calendar which was still retained by 
England. Exceptions are indicated by the parenthetical addition of 'O.S.'. Where Old Style 
dates are used, the years are invariably modernised to begin on 1 January. 
5 Sir William Alexander, An Encouragement to Colonies (London, 1624), p. 32; Sir Ferdinando 
Gorges, "A Brief Narration of the Originall Undertakings of the Advancement of Plantations 
into the Parts of America", Maine Historical Society Collections, II (1847), p. 48. 
6 Alexander, Encouragement, p. 32. 
7 The charter is printed in John George Bourinot, "Builders of Nova Scotia", Proceedings 
and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, ser. 2, 5 (1899), sec. 2, pp. 104-21. 
8 Alexander, Encouragement, pp. 38-9. See also Donaldson, Scotland, pp. 252-5; for dis-
cussion of the complexities of the relationship between Scottish economy and population, 
see Devine and Lythe, "Scottish Economy", p. 97. 
9 Burton, PC Register, ser. I, XII, pp. 773-4; ibid., ser. II, I, p. 80. 
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Since the territory of New Scotland was devined in the charter by land-
marks rather than by latitudes, Alexander claimed with some justification 
"that mine be the first National Patent that ever was cleerly bounded within 
America by particular limits upon the Earth".10 Extending north and east 
from the length of the Ste. Croix river as far as the St. Lawrence river, the 
grant comprehended the modern Maritime Provinces and the Gaspé; all of 
these lands were conveyed to Sir William Alexander, his heirs and assigns, 
as "one entire and free lordship and barony which shall be called in all 
future time by the aforesaid name of New Scotland".11 Thus defined, the 
Scottish grant further complicated the pattern of European claims. With New 
England, the proposed Scottish colony had for the moment a friendly under-
standing; with New Netherland, the potential area of conflict was not large, 
concerning only the southern part of what was later to become peninsular 
Nova Scotia. With New France, on the other hand, the area of conflict was 
much more considerable. This was especially true after 1627, when a new 
Company of New France was granted "tout le longue des costes depuis la 
Floride . . en rengeant les costes de la mer jusques au Cercle Artique pour 
latitude".12 From the start, Alexander was well aware of this conflict, al-
though he did not, as a Scotsman, emphasize competition with France as 
heavily as he did the Englishman Gorges.13 In fact, a review of the French 
colonisation of Acadia led Alexander to the conclusion that the French were 
only "sleightly planted" there.14 
When Alexander remarked upon the slightness of the French hold upon 
Acadia he was, of course, quite right, although his reasons — he blamed 
laziness and internal quarrels among the French colonists — were superficial. 
The truth was that no European country had yet found a practical way to 
make good its vast territorial claims in North America. Although by 1621 
both France and England had been attempting for fifteen years to emulate 
the example of extensive colonisation which had been set by Spain in central 
and South America, the only settlements which had been established were 
small and isolated communal habitations perched precariously on the coasts 
of America. While these settlements resembled the Portuguese trading 
factories in Africa and Asia, for France and England they were the un-
10 Alexander, Encouragement, p. 32. 
11 Bourinot, "Builders of Nova Scotia", pp. 104-7, 118-9. 
12 Collection de Manuscrits Contenant Lettres, Mémoires, et Autres Documents Historiques 
Relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, Recueillis aux Archives de la Province de Québec, ou Copiés 
à l'Etranger (Québec, 1883), I, pp. 65-6. 
13 See Sir Ferdinando Gorges, "A Brief Relation of the Discovery and Plantation of New 
England", in Henry Sweetser Burrage, ed., Gorges and the Grant of the Province of Maine 
(Portland, 1923), pp. 142-3. 
14 Alexander, Encouragement, pp. 36-8. 
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welcome creations of necessity rather than of choice, products of the gap 
between vast conceptions and inadequate techniques and resources. If 
North American colonies had contained mines of precious metals requiring 
inland establishments for their exploitation, or even if colonies could have 
become staging points for the Far Eastern trade through a north-western 
passage to the Pacific, then they would have been unquestionably useful and 
valuable. As it was, the colonies established, such as the English settlements 
at Sagadahoc and Jamestown and their French counterparts at Quebec and 
Port Royal, had succeeded only in absorbing large amounts of capital without 
visible return. The communal habitation, at first intended simply as a base 
for the more extensive exploration of a colony and its resources, had tended 
to become the whole of the colony. Such an establishment could carry on 
the fishing and fur trades, but for these commercial purposes single voyages 
could be cheaper and more convenient than colonisation. When such a 
prominent observer as the Duc de Sully, the chief minister of Henry IV of 
France, failed to see any value in North American colonisation, he was not 
being obstinately unprogressive, but was raising a real question.15 
The New Scotland colony was certainly not exempt from the difficulties 
which plagued all European attempts in North America. Lack of capital was, 
as always, a grave hindrance, and was one principal reason why an expedition 
of 1622-23 returned without having founded a settlement.16 The institution 
of an order of Knights-Baronets in 1623, a measure consciously modelled 
upon the Ulster baronetcies, was intended to bring in up to 450,000 merks, 
or £22,500 sterling, through baronets' compulsory contributions to the 
colony.17 Although opposition to the new order by small barons (whose 
status was threatened) was overcome, under-subscription of the order re-
mained a fundamental problem.18 Whether through scepticism regarding the 
New Scotland colony, dislike of the parvenu Sir William Alexander, who had 
recently become royal Secretary for Scotland, or both of these, the Knights-
Baronetcies were little in demand. Despite a deliberate easing of procedural 
formalities associated with the order, rather defensive assertions that Alex-
ander had used the colony's funds honestly, and threatening letters to indi-
15 See Marcel Trudel, Histoire de la Nouvelle-France; Le Comptoir, 1604-1627 (Ottawa. 
1966), p. 14. 
16 See Alexander, Encouragement, pp. 33-4; also William Robert Scott. The Constitution and 
Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 (Cambridge, 1912), 
II, p. 318. 
17 Burton, PC Register, ser. I, XIII, pp. 650-1. Each of the anticipated 150 baronets would 
pay 1000 merks, as well as supplying six colonists or paying a further 2000 merks in lieu. 
18 See Cosmo Innés et al., eds., The Acts of the Parliament of Scotland ( 12 vols., Edinburgh, 
1844-75), V, p. 184; also Charles Rogers, ed., The Earl of Stirling's Register of Royal Letters 
Relative to the Affairs of Scotland and Nova Scotia from 1615 to 1635 (Edinburgh, 1885), 
I, p. 18. 
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viduals implying that their future advancement would depend upon their 
accepting the title of Knight-Baronet as "a nixte steppe to a further title", 
relatively few Knights-Baronetcies were ever conferred.19 A Privy Seal 
register records only ninety up until 1638, though some twenty others may be 
added from other sources.20 None of these was ever taken up in New Scotland, 
and the expenses of Sir William Alexander were never significantly defrayed 
thereby. 
Nevertheless, Alexander proceeded with his efforts, making extensive 
inroads on his personal wealth. By the summer of 1628 a fleet had been 
assembled at Dumbarton under Alexander's son, the younger Sir William. 
Long delayed in Dumbarton by financial difficulties and by desertions 
among the prospective colonists, the fleet eventually set sail for America 
in the spring of 1628.21 By this time, the outbreak of war between Charles I's 
kingdoms and France had given the younger Alexander the company on at 
least part of his voyage of the brothers Kirke, English privateers who were 
active in efforts to capture the St Lawrence settlements from the French, 
in which they succeeded in 1629.22 In 1629 also, after Alexander had wintered 
elsewhere in America — perhaps on the Gaspé coast or at Tadoussac — two 
New Scotland settlements were established, on Cape Breton and at Port 
Royal,23 although the Cape Breton settlement, under the command of Lord 
19 Burton, PC Register, ser. II, I, p. 365; Rogers, Stirling's Register, I, pp. 30, 68, 118-9. 
20 Privy Seal Register PS5/1, Scottish Record Office [hereafter SRO], Edinburgh. See also 
David Laing, ed., Royal Letters, Charters, and Tracts, Relating to the Colonization of New 
Scotland and the Institution of the Order of Knights Baronets of Nova Scotia, 1621 to 1638 
(Edinburgh, 1867), pp. 120-3. Later Knights-Baronetcies were conferred, but purely as 
titles of honour. 
21 Dumbarton Burgh Records, printed as an appendix to McGrail, Alexander, pp. 233-5; 
Burton, PC Register, ser. II, II, pp. 313-4. 
22 See Marcel Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 1524-1663 (Toronto, 1973), pp. 174-5. 
23 It should be pointed out that this date has been challenged, most recently in McGrail, 
Alexander, pp. 236-45. Evidence in favour of dating the settlement in 1629 has been mar-
shalled in George Pratt Insh, Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620-1686 (Glasgow, 1922), pp. 
214-26; a further useful review of the evidence is included in Daniel Cobb Harvey, "Sir 
William Alexander and Nova Scotia", Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 30 
(1954), pp. 19-22. Without repeating the arguments advanced, it would seem conclusive 
that those Scots and Englishmen who favoured retention of Port Royal by the Scots crown 
in the peace negotiations of 1629-32 never denied that the Scots settlement had been made 
there after the interim Peace of Suza, which had provided that all conquests made after 23 
April 1629 should be restored. In a diplomatic dispatch of 22 June 1631, the king himself 
stated, in relation to Quebec and Port Royal respectively, "that one of these places was 
taken and the plantation made in the other after the peace". Charles I to Sir Isaac Wake, 
Ambassador in France, 22 June 1631, State Papers (Foreign), SP78/89, f. 210, Public Record 
Office [hereafter PRO J, London. Also implied in this statement, of course, is the assertion 
that Port Royal had not then been "taken", as had Quebec, but had been peacefully occupied 
in fulfilment of the long-standing New Scotland grant. 
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Ochiltree, was seized in September and destroyed by a French raiding 
force.24 This raid served as a reminder that both the Kirkes and the Alex-
anders were regarded as trespassers by the French; furthermore, both the 
seizure of Quebec by the Kirkes and the settlement of New Scotland had 
taken place, albeit unknowingly, after the conclusion of an interim peace 
treaty at Suza in April of 1629. Thus it was with the sure prospect of eventual 
French demands for restitution that the surviving New Scotland settlement 
at Port Royal faced its first winter in 1629-30. 
A further problem which arose during that winter, and one which had 
affected all infant European settlements in North America, was disease. In 
1630, Claude de la Tour, a veteran French coloniser who had resided in 
Acadia for some twenty years, reported that "il estoit mort trente Escossois 
de septante qu'ils estoient en cet hyvernement, qui avoient esté mal accom-
modez".25 Also acute was the problem, characteristic of communal colonies, 
of excessive dependence upon the mother country. In early 1630, Sir William 
Alexander the elder became progressively more agitated in London as he 
attempted to find capital with which to send out relief. On 9 February, he 
wrote to the Earl of Menteith, the President of the Scots Privy Council, of 
his worry "concerneing my sone's supplie, whereupon his saftie or ruine doth 
depend . . . ; there is no monie to be had here [in London] and therefore 
whatever happen, I wold the ship that is fraughted at Leith [in Scotland] 
were hasted away with some twentie or threttie good fellowes, and so much 
for provisions as she may carie . . . ."26 Apparently this broad hint was 
heeded, but the very urgency of the need for Menteith's help illustrates the 
dependent position of the colony.27 
On the other hand, there are indications that in some respects the Scottish 
colony, by the admittedly modest standards of other European attempts in 
North America, was succeeding rather well. One prerequisite for the sur-
vival of a communal colony was to have harmonious Indian relations, since 
the Indians played an essential role in communicating techniques for sub-
sisting in the American environment, and in providing furs by way of trade. 
There was also the practical consideration that Indian hostility would almost 
certainly result in the destruction of any tiny European settlement which 
incurred it. In the case of the Scottish settlement at Port Royal, good rela-
tions seem to have been early established. The colonists were visited shortly 
after their arrival by "2 savages in a Canou", and a few weeks later by "9 
24 Petition of Captain Constance Ferrar, December 1629, State Papers (Colonial), CO 1/5, no. 
41, PRO; Memorial and Information of Lord Ochiltree, January 1630, ibid., nos. 46, 47. 
25 Henry Percival Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain (Toronto, 1922), VI, p. 176. 
26 William Fraser, ed., The Red Book of Menteith (Edinburgh, 1880), II, pp. 111-2. 
27 Ibid., p. 113. 
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savages in a Shalles [shallop] from S. Johns River with beaver skines and 
hydes [who] gave the generali a present".28 Further, a contemporary reported 
in a letter of February 1631 that Charles I himself had been visited by friendly 
Indians from the area of the Scottish colony: "there came last week to London 
the king, queen and young prince of New Scotland. This king comes to be of 
our king's religion and to submit his kingdom to him . . . ."29 
There were also indications that even those French who still remained in 
Acadia might be willing to convert to the Scottish allegiance in return for 
certain guarantees. Captured by the Kirkes in 1628, Claude de la Tour was 
carried to England, where he apparently met with Alexander. The subsequent 
episode is the subject of conflicting evidence, but it seems clear that Alex-
ander made an agreement with La Tour that he and his son, Charles (also a 
long-standing resident of Acadia), would be made Knights-Baronets, an agree-
ment which Alexander fulfilled on 30 November 1629 and 12 May 1630 re-
spectively.30 By the agreement, the La Tours would hold an area in the 
southern part of the New Scotland peninsula, from the Cloven Cape to Mir-
liquesh, would divide the fur trade with Alexander, and would be free to 
make settlements on their territory; in return, they promised "d'estre bons et 
fidèles sujets et Vasseaux dudit Roy [d'Escosse], et luy rendre toute obéis-
sance et assister vers les Peuples a la reduction dudit Pais et Coste d'Ac-
cadie".31 The evidence of Samuel de Champlain, without giving credence to 
a more dramatic contemporary account by Nicolas Denys, suggests that La 
Tour was unable to convince his son to endorse this agreement and the 
father himself abandoned the Scottish allegiance later in 1630, after supplies 
had been sent to his son by the Company of New France.32 However, a sur-
viving fragment of a letter of the Scots crown in February 1630, referring to 
28 Anonymous Account of New Scotland, 1630, Hawthornden MSS, vol. IX, f. 149, National 
Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS 2061. 
29 Quoted in George Patterson, "Sir William Alexander and the Scottish Attempt to Colonize 
Acadia", Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 10 (1892), sec. 2, 
p. 95. 
30 Laing, Royal Letters, Charters and Tracts, p. 122. For a commentary upon some of the ques-
tions involved, see Robert Le Blant, "La Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la Restitution 
de l'Acadie, 1627-1636", Revue d'Histoire des Colonies, 42 (1955), p. 74; and George 
MacBeath, "Charles de Saint-Etienne de la Tour", and "Claude de Saint-Etienne de la 
Tour", DCB, I, pp. 592-98. 
31 Articles of Agreement between Alexander and La Tour, 6 October 1629, Egerton MSS, 
vol. 2395, f. 17, British Museum, London. The dating of this document, 6 October 1629 at 
Port Royal, is perhaps suspect. See LeBlant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la 
Restitution", p. 74. There is no reason, however, to doubt the authenticity of the contents. 
32 Biggar, Works of Champlain, VI, pp. 172-5; Nicolas Denys, Description Géographique et 
Historique des Costes de l'Amérique Septentrionale avec l'Histoire Naturelle du Pais, éd. 
William Francis Ganong (Toronto, 1908), pp. 477-9. 
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letters received from "Charles St. Estienne (de la Tour] Baronne", suggests 
that the younger La Tour may not have been altogether unflinching in his 
rejection of the Scots offer.33 The very fact that such an agreement was 
seriously considered illustrates that the Scottish settlement at Port Royal 
was sufficiently well rooted to be impressive even to its enemies. Further 
corroboration of the increasingly strong position of the Scots colonists can 
be found in the report of a lieutenant of the La Tours, after their decision to 
give allegiance to France rather than to Scotland. In the summer of 1631 this 
report brought news to France "comme les Escossois ne se resoudoient point 
à quitter le Port Royal, mais qu'ils s'y accommodoient de jour à autre, et y 
avoient fait venir quelques mesnages et bestiaux pour peupler ce lieu qui ne 
leur appartient que par l'usurpation qu'ils en ont fait".34 
While the small-scale communal style of colonisation was very far from 
fulfilling the European ideal of extensive colonisation on the Spanish model, 
a worthwhile start had been made, and on 13 May 1630 Charles I addressed 
an encouraging letter to Sir William Alexander the younger. Praising Alex-
ander's "carefull and provident proceeding for planting of a colonie at Port 
Royall, which may be a means to setle all that cuntrie in obedience", the 
king offered "hartlie thankis for the same, and doe wish you (as wee are 
confident you will) to continow as you have begunne, that the wark may be 
brought to the intendit perfectione"; this, he continued, "wee will esteem as 
one of the most singulare services done unto us . . . ."35 This was a remarkably 
emphatic endorsement of the Alexanders' progress in New Scotland. Yet 
only eight months later, on 17 February 1631, a decision was taken in London 
that, in return for certain French concessions, which included the payment 
of the outstanding balance of the dowry of Charles I's French queen, Henri-
etta Maria, the Port Royal colony would be evacuated.36 This decision, made 
in response to French demands during the negotiations which followed the 
interim Peace of Suza, preceded by more than a year the signing of the 
final peace treaty at St-Germain-en-Laye on 29 March 1632. Nevertheless, 
the abandonment of Port Royal was ordered by Charles I on 4 July 1631, 
was eventually implemented in late 1632, and virtually closed the history of 
settlement in New Scotland.37 Although the king was still insisting on 24 
April 1633, in a letter to the Commissioners for the Plantation of New 
Scotland, "that our said Viscount [Sir William Alexander the elder, now 
33 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 420. 
34 Biggar, Works of Champlain, VI, p. 199. 
35 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 439. 
36 "Contents of a letter to be written to his Majesties Agents at Paris", 17 February 1631, 
SP 78/88, ff. 145-6, PRO. 
37 Royal Order for the abandonment of Port Royal, 4 July 1631, CO 1/6, no. 17, PRO; see 
also Le Blant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la Restitution", p. 84. 
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raised to the nobility as Viscount Stirling ] . . . shall prosecute the said 
work", no such attempt was ever made.38 
Why was New Scotland apparently so easily given up, after a decade of 
endeavour and at a time when the colony was beginning to establish itself 
securely? Historians of New Scotland have addressed themselves to this 
question and have usually found the answer in the flawed personal character 
of Charles I, in the faulty statesmanship of himself and his government, 
or in both. Most scathing in their treatment of Charles were late nineteenth-
century historians, often connected with the modern Province of Nova 
Scotia, who wrote specifically about the efforts of Sir William Alexander. 
"It is difficult to account", wrote Rev. George Patterson in 1892, "for the 
conduct of Charles throughout these proceedings. It seems to manifest 
stupidity or duplicity altogether inexplicable, or as we are inclined to believe 
a large mixture of both".39 Stupidity, or duplicity? Charles Rogers, writing 
in 1885, was inclined to believe that the former rather than the latter was the 
key to the episode, and blamed "a vacillating policy".40 Also on the side of 
stupidity was J. B. Brebner, who in 1927 decided that "one can be charitable, 
and attribute his [Charles I'sl actions to the undoubted confusion of geo-
graphical knowledge and nomenclature".41 Other historians of New Scotland 
have tended to attribute the restitution to a duplicity arising from Charles's 
financial difficulties and his consequent anxiety to obtain the balance of the 
queen's dowry. W. F. Ganong observed in 1908 "that Canada and Acadia 
were to be returned to France, for reasons which were personal with the two 
Kings and concerned not the good of their empires".42 G. P. Insh similarly 
concluded in 1922 that "like a later . . . Scottish colonial scheme [a refer-
ence to the Darien scheme of 1698], the Nova Scotia enterprise was to be 
sacrificed to the exigencies of English Royal policy".43 Between Ganong and 
Insh, a useful impression is gained of the complex interaction of the interests 
of the respective crowns of Scotland, England and France; but Charles I 
remains as the cynical destroyer of the New Scotland colony. 
Clearly there was a discrepancy between the stated aims of the Scots 
crown, which continued even after 1632 to avow its support for the re-
establishment of New Scotland, and the actual results of the treaty of St.-
Germain. Among those who have taken serious note of this are H. P. Biggar, 
T. H. McGrail and D. C. Harvey. In explaining the paradox, however, even 
these historians have invariably fallen back upon the alleged personal 
38 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 664. 
39 Patterson, "Sir William Alexander and the Scottish Attempt", p. 99. 
40 Rogers, Stirling's Register, I, p. xxxvii. 
41 John Bartlet Brebner, New England's Outpost (New York, 1927), p. 26. 
42 Denys, Description Géographique et Historique, Introduction, p. 4. 
43 Insh, Scottish Colonial Schemes, p. 85. This statement is reaffirmed in George Pratt Insh, 
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deficiencies of Charles I. Biggar in 1901 concluded a thorough and balanced 
narrative treatment of the treaty negotiations by observing that the king 
"seems to have taken the surrender of Port Royal very lightly", and believed 
"the real truth" to be "that Port Royal was sacrificed on account of the 
King's pressing need of money".44 McGrail, while giving Charles I credit for 
having "fully intended the abandonment of the colony by his subjects to be 
merely temporary", nevertheless argued in 1940 that the colony had lost its 
chance of survival because "Charles had . . . used it to gratify his own selfish 
desires".45 Harvey similarly asserted in 1954 that the king's "vision was 
dazzled by the prospects of getting the 400,000 crowns still owing in his 
wife's dowry".46 Duplicity, stupidity, financial rapacity: with all the variations 
which have appeared in interpretations of the restitution of Port Royal, the 
motives and aims of the Scots crown have invariably been portrayed as crude, 
self-defeating and unsavoury in character. Yet a re-examination of the 
evidence sheds grave doubts upon these interpretations. 
The lines along which the negotiations between French and British would 
be pursued in 1629-32, and the bounds of possible areas of serious disagree-
ment as regards North America, were quickly established after the interim 
treaty of Suza had ended actual hostilities on 24 April 1629.47 The French 
position was clearly stated in a memorial later in 1629, demanding the restora-
tion both of Quebec and other parts of Canada which had been seized by the 
Kirkes in the summer of 1629, and of "les places de la Cadye" which had been 
settled by the Scots shortly afterwards. The French made no distinction 
between the occupied areas of the St Lawrence region and those of Acadia, 
holding both to be exclusively French territory which had been occupied by 
English and Scots after the interim treaty: were restitution not agreed, re-
newal of warfare was threatened. The memorial also noted that provisional 
agreement had already been reached over Canada, while the British had 
asked for further negotiations over the settlements in Acadia.48 
44 Henry Percival Biggar, The Early Trading Companies of New France (Toronto, 1901), 
pp. 160, 163-4. 
45 McGrail, Alexander, pp. 117-8. 
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which he would eventually sign the treaty of St-Germain. 
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On 2 March 1630, the French ambassador in London, Charles de l'Aupes-
pine, Marquis de Châteauneuf, confirmed that Charles I was willing to give 
up the conquests in Canada, but was undecided on the question "du Cap 
Breton et Port roial".49 The royal indecision regarding Port Royal was also 
remarked upon later in March, in a letter from Robert earl of Nithsdale, a 
Scottish nobleman who favoured a close understanding with France, to a Mr. 
Scott of London. The passage is somewhat obscure, but is suggestive never-
theless: "for the mater of Canada he [Châteauneuf] will get contentment 
for that which [is] in the pouer of the Counsell of England; and for Sir 
William Alexander's part, I know ther is means eused be the man he fears 
that the King may give satisfaction leykweyis; and I hope it sail prevail".50 In 
the following month, a meeting between Charles and Châteauneuf further 
clarified their respective positions, not entirely to the satisfaction of either 
side. As the English Secretary of State, Sir Dudley Carleton, Viscount Dor-
chester, wrote to Sir Isaac Wake, Ambassador in France, a private agree-
ment had been reached that Quebec would be restored "because the French 
were removed out of it by strong hand". On the question of the Scottish 
settlement, however, Châteauneuf had "seemed to go away ill satisfyed, that 
he could not obtayne a direct promise from His Majesty for the restoring of 
Port Royall, joyning to Canada, where some Scottish men are planted under 
the title of Nova Scotia". While Charles had promised "thus much that unies 
he found reason as well before, as since the warre, to have that Place free* 
for his Subjects plantation, he would recall them", Dorchester recalled to 
Wake that the Scots had "there seated themselves in a place where no French 
did inhabite",51 and furthermore expressed a belief that on this point Château-
neuf had spoken "rather out of his owne discourse . . . then by Commission".52 
On Port Royal, Charles I was clearly unsure of his ground. He was prepared 
to stand fast if assured that the Scottish right was a legitimate one, dating from 
before the late war, and he doubted the strength of the French commitment 
to Acadia; but he was unwilling to become involved in a controversy with 
Châteauneuf until provided with stronger and more detailed arguments. It 
was in this context that the king sent his letter of encouragement to the 
younger Alexander on 13 May 1630; his "hartlie thankis" to Alexander and 
hopes for the continuance of the colony were not inconsistent with his 
diplomatic discussions and his ensuing effort to find arguments which would 
49 Châteauneuf to Bouthilier, 2 March 1630, ibid., vol. 44, ff. 32-7. 
50 William Fraser, The Book of Caerlaverock: Memoirs of the Maxwells, Earls of Nithsdale, 
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Royal itself since 1623. See Azarie Couillard-Després, Charles de Saint-Etienne de la Tour, 
Lieutenant-Général en Acadie at Son Temps, 1593-1666 (Arthabaska, P.Q., 1930), pp. 143-8. 
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justify the retention of New Scotland. On 3 July the king wrote to instruct the 
Scots Privy Council to investigate the whole matter: "as we ar bund in dewtie 
and justice to discherge what we ow to everie nyghbour prince, so we most 
have a care that none of our subjects doe suffer in that which they have under-
t a k e upon just grounds to doe ws service". "We desyer", the letter continued, 
"to be certifeid how far we and our subjects are interessed therein, and what 
arguments ar fitt to be used when any question shall occurre concerneing 
the same, for the defence thairof . . . ."53 
In reply, the Convention of Estates, an enlarged version of the Privy 
Council which approximated to the Parliament in membership and in certain 
of its powers, "having dewlie considderit the benefite arysing to this king-
dome by the accessioun of Newscotland and of the successfull plantatioun 
already made there by the gentlemen undertakers of the same", unanimously 
agreed on 31 July "that his Majestie sail be petitioned to mainteane his right 
of Newscotland And to protect his subjects undertakers of the said plantation 
in the peacable possessioun of the same As being a purpose highlie concern-
ing his Majesties honnour and the good and crédite of this his ancient king-
dome". On royal invitation, and no doubt encouraged by the personal 
presence of Sir William Alexander, the Convention on the same day ratified 
and confirmed anew the order of Knights-Baronets. 54 The Privy Council, 
for its part, wrote to the king on 9 September "by order from the Estaits" 
to urge that he resist "the title predendit by the Frenshe to the lands of 
New Scotland".55 Enclosed was a statement drawn up by Alexander of 
"Reasons alleaged by the Scottish Adventurers for the holding of Port Royal", 
in which Alexander derived the king's title to New Scotland from the voyages 
of Cabot, and recalled the removal of the French from Acadia in 1613 by 
the raiding Englishman Samuel Argali, several years after which "a Colonie 
of Scottish was planted at Port Royal, which had never been repossessed 
nor claimed by the French since they were first removed from the same". Not 
only had the local Indians recognised Charles I's authority, but so had La 
Tour, "cheef commander of the few French then in that Countrie", who had 
found "the coming in of the Scottish necessary for his securitie" and had 
therefore decided on "turning Tenant". The king, it was argued, was honour 
bound to protect all of these subjects, and "this business of Port royall can-
not bee made Lyable to the articles of the peace, seeing there was no act of 
hostilitie comitted thereby, a Colony only being planted upon his Majesties 
owne ground."56 
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While support of the Convention and the Privy Council for New Scotland 
was predictable, in view of Alexander's active efforts in his own interest, the 
royal appeal for counsel had been met with a positive response. The British 
position in the treaty negotiations with France was now converted into one of 
defence of the Scottish right to Port Royal, and thus into direct conflict with 
the French insistence upon restitution. In the event, the French stood firm. 
On 7 December 1630, the British negotiators, René Augier and Henry De Vie, 
reported to Dorchester than even an attempt to have the matter postponed 
to future negotiation had been categorically refused by the French: Château-
neuf, by now recalled to France as Chancellor, had replied "que le fait dudit 
Port Royal estoit joint avec le reste".57 The negotiators agreed, however, with 
Dorchester's earlier estimation that this attitude arose rather from Château-
neufs personal pride than from any more calculated French regard for 
Acadia. What the Chancellor wished, they wrote on 17 December, was 
"l'exécution des choses qu'il dit luy avoir esté promis [allegedly promised, that 
is, while Châteauneuf had been in London as ambassador] touchant le Port 
Royal, de quoy il fait encore son affaire propre . . . ." 58 On 21 January 
1631 Augier and De Vie reported to Dorchester on certain mercantile 
clauses which had been agreed, but added that "le different du Port Royal 
. . . est l'unique accroche de l'exécution de ce que dessus, e t . . . seul empesche 
aujourd'hui cette liberté et utilité réciproque". Châteauneuf, they went on, 
still persisted in his view that the vital point was that "les Escossois n'y [ to 
New Scotland] ont jamais envoyé aucune plantation en vertu desdit patentes 
sinon depuis cette dernière paix", and that "Mr. Alexandre Secretaire 
d'Escosse . . . seul empesche par son interest particulier que ces deux Cour-
connes ne jouissent de benefice de la paix". The French demanded the annul-
ment of the agreements between Alexander and La Tour and Charles I's 
permission to remove the Scots from Port Royal "sans prejudice de l'Alli-
ance qu'il [the French king] a avec la Nation et Royaume d'Escosse".59 
This latter proposal could not be acceptable to Charles, but a week later, 
in a further report from Augier and De Vie, it became even clearer that the 
Acadian question was posing a grave danger to the whole basis of the peace. 
"The only difficulty", went the report, "resteth in the accommodation of 
the business of the Porte-Royall". Worse still, the negotiators themselves, 
as they informed Dorchester with dutiful frankness, felt that the French 
57 De Vic and Augier to Dorchester, 7 December 1630, SP 78/97, ff. 459-60, PRO. For notes 
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argument was "unanswerable", unless Alexander could improve the quality 
of his own contentions. They believed that the French would not yield, and 
passed on a report that a French fleet of eight or ten ships was ready in 
Brittany to go to the recovery of Port Royal.60 Thus, by late January 1631. 
the question of Port Royal threatened to lead to a resumption of war between 
Britain and France. For Charles I, this situation was as surprising as it was 
uncomfortable. As he was to remark a few weeks later to the French Am-
bassador, "places taken and held upon that whole continent of America 
have never binne drawne so into consequence by the Princes of Europe as 
thereupon to frame dispute for interruption of treatyes betwixt kingdomes 
and States . . . ."61 Yet the fact remained that the French were insisting 
upon the restitution of Port Royal, even after the British agreement to restore 
Quebec, and were apparently prepared to hazard the peace accordingly. 
France had recently obtained a degree of relief in its involvement in the 
Thirty Years' War through the conclusion of the treaty of Barwalde with 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden on 23 January, and thus would henceforth be 
able more easily to afford a renewal of war with Charles I. Charles, on the 
other hand, as king of England, was particularly anxious for peace, as he was 
still in the early stages of his personal rule and could not afford to wage war 
without parliamentary grants.62 For all that, as king of Scotland he did not 
wish to lose face by repudiating his obligations in New Scotland, thereby 
embarrassing his Secretary for Scotland, Alexander; nor did he wish to lose 
the benefits in trade and prestige potentially offered by New Scotland. 
Thus caught in a perplexing dilemma, the king and his advisors were ready 
to seize upon a further aspect of the report of Augier and De Vie of 28 
January, which seemed to offer both an explanation of the French behaviour 
and a possible way of winning both peace with France and the retention of 
New Scotland. In the opinion of the negotiators, the French, and especially 
Châteauneuf, were more interested in Port Royal as a point of honour than 
in Acadia as a colony. Rumour had it, moreover, that the Port Royal fur trade 
"will not amount to above 800 or lm. [ 1000] skinnes of Orignac by the 
yeare, and a few more Castors". De Vie and Augier therefore suggested a 
strategy: "if Sir William Alexander wolde exchange that Seate for some other 
upon the same coast, and not farr distant from the porte Royall, and some 
meanes were founde to indemnize him of parte of the charges hee hath been 
att to make his plantation, it may bee that wolde give them satisfaction here 
in pointe of honour".63 At a meeting in London on 17 February, the king 
60 De Vie and Augier to Dorchester, 28 January 1631, ibid., ff. 50-1. 
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and his advisors on foreign affairs decided to take this opportunity for a 
settlement.64 The evacuation of Port Royal, with the temporary abandonment 
of New Scotland, was unpalatable and inconvenient, but it had the great 
advantage of securing peace. It also had the further advantage of giving 
Charles I the chance to require other French concessions as quid pro quo: it 
was decided to demand certain restitutions of English ships and prisoners, as 
well as the payment of the balance of Queen Henrietta Maria's dowry. Not 
least, the evacuation avoided any necessity of giving up New Scotland al-
together and promised an opportunity of resuming activities in the colony 
within a short time. 
The results of this meeting were duly conveyed to the negotiators in a letter 
drafted by Dorchester on 2 March. In the letter, the Scottish claim to Port 
Royal was asserted at some length, and New Scotland described as insepar-
able from the realm of Scotland; nevertheless, if a real peace would be the 
result, if the French would fulfill the required conditions, and if the French 
would guarantee not to molest the La Tours (a requirement which presented 
no difficulty, since the La Tours had already been accepted back to the 
French allegiance), the king would "dispense with all other considerations".65 
On 1 April, at Dijon, these terms were privately agreed.66 Their formal accep-
tance in London was communicated by the king to Wake in a dispatch of 22 
June, announcing his purpose of "laying a foundation of a firmer friendship 
[with France] than hath beene of late yeares . . . ." From Port Royal, the 
king went on, "such of our Subjects as are there planted shall retire, leaving 
these parts in the same state they were before the peace. Which we doe not 
out of ignorance, as if we did not understand how little we are hereunto 
obliged . . . but out of an affection and desire to comply with our good 
brother the French king in all things that may frendly and reasonably, though 
not rightly and duly, bee demanded of us".67 
On 10 July, a royal warrant to Sir William Alexander ordered the demoli-
tion of the Scots fort at Port Royal; eighteen days later a formal act was 
issued under the Great Seal of Scotland, for transmission to the French king, 
relinquishing Port Royal. Both documents made it clear, however, that, as 
the agreement was understood in Scotland, the intent was that "Port Royall 
shall be putt in the estate it was befor the beginning of the warre, that no 
pairtie may have any advantage ther dureing the continuance of the same, 
64 "Contents of a letter to be written to his Majesties Agents at Paris", 17 February 1631, 
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and without derogation to any preceiding right or title . . ." The formal act 
declared that the relinquishment was made "without any prejudice to our 
right or title or those of our subjects in perpetuity". At this stage, there was 
not even any admission on the Scottish side that the upshot would be in any 
sense a restitution of Port Royal to the French; although the French crown 
was made responsible for arranging the details of the Scots evacuation, and 
would thus necessarily send an expedition for this purpose, Port Royal was 
to be left "altogidder waist and unpeopled" 68 
As was consistent with this strategic withdrawal, the relinquishment of 
Port Royal was accompanied by the bestowal of a number of advancements 
upon Sir William Alexander, which displayed, as they were intended to do, 
the continuance of royal confidence and favour towards him not only as a 
subject and as Secretary for Scotland but also as a coloniser. The patent 
creating Alexander viscount of Stirling had been prepared in September of 
1630, "for the good and faithfull service done be him to his Majestie and for 
his chargeable undertaking of the plantatioun of New Scotland"; after exhi-
bition to the Privy Council, it was delivered on 5 July 1631.69 On 10 July, the 
very day on which the warrant for demolition of the Port Royal fort was 
dated, Stirling was elevated to the bench of the court of session and a precept 
was issued to the Treasurer of Scotland ordering that Stirling be assigned 
any royal profits arising from the coinage of copper farthings. Two days later, 
a royal instruction to the Treasury enjoined that special care be taken that 
Stirling "should enjoy the whole benefite belonging unto his place", that is, 
the profits of his office of Secretary for Scotland.70 Later elevated to be first 
earl of that name, Stirling continued to enjoy royal favour throughout the 
1630s. In early 1632 a royal warrant for the sum of £10,000 sterling was 
issued "for satisfaction of the losses that the said Viscount hath, by giveing 
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ordour for removeing of his Colony at our express command". This order 
was most emphatic that the grant was in no way "for quyting the title, right, 
or possession of New Scotland, or of any part thereof, bot onlie for satis-
faction of the losses . . . ; we are so far from abandoning of that bussines 
as we doe heirby requyre yow [the Exchequer] and everie ane of yow to 
afford your best help and encouragement for furthering of the same . . . ."71 
This latter affirmation was reflected in virtually every royal reference to 
New Scotland throughout the decade. As early as 12 July 1631, the Privy 
Council was instructed to consider the best means to further prosecute the 
New Scotland scheme: "we wilbe verie carefull to mainteane all our good 
subjects who doe plant themselffis ther . . . ." A royal letter to the Knights-
Baronets just over a year later assured them of the continuance of New 
Scotland despite "the Colonie being forced of late to remove for a tyme by 
means of a treatie we have had with the French".72 On 28 June 1633, all of 
Stirling's patents and rights in New Scotland were specifically confirmed by 
the Scots Parliament, and in the Privy Council in the following February "a 
letter was produced from his Majestie tuiching the furtherance of the planta-
tion of New Scotland and ane Act passed thereupon accordinglie".73 Knights-
Baronetcies issued until 1638 continued, moreover, to carry grants of 
American land.74 
And yet, the continuance of New Scotland never had any basis in American 
reality. Despite the repeated affirmations to the contrary, the surrender of 
Port Royal and the shipping of the colonists to Le Havre, where they arrived 
on 11 February 1633, was a crushing blow to the colony. If the course of 
action of the Scots crown was basically neither dishonest nor foolish, why 
did its aims miscarry so completely? In essence, the crown had made two 
understandable but fundamental miscalculations, which were compounded 
in their results by a particular mischance. The mischance lay in the death of 
Dorchester on 25 February 1632, at a crucial point in the negotiations. 
As a result of Dorchester's illness and of the ensuing hiatus before his business 
was taken up by the other Secretary of State, Sir John Coke, there was a 
lapse of several months in correspondence between London and Sir Isaac 
Wake, who had by now taken over the negotiations in France. Writing to 
Coke on 13 April, Wake complained of delays and expressed his hope "that 
some of your Secretaries will take notice of the receipt of my letters, which 
comfort I have wanted now five months together".75 An apologetic reply 
71 Ibid., pp. 575-8. 
72 Ibid., pp. 545, 619. Italics mine. 
73 Innes, Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, V, p. 43; Burton, PC Register, ser. II, V, p. 209. 
74 For an example, see the "Procuratory of Resignation by William, Earl of Stirling", 31 Decem-
ber 1636, GD 17/501, SRO. 
75 Wake to Coke, 13 April 1632, SP 78/91, ff. 120-21, PRO. 
Acadiensis 57 
from Coke could not repair the damage already done, which was two-fold 
as regards New Scotland. First, no notice had been taken of a dispatch from 
Wake of 20 January which contained a first hint that the French plan for 
Acadia might involve more than the salving of a point of honour. The French, 
Wake had reported, were planning an expedition to repossess Quebec; so 
much was to be expected. In addition, however, "Mr. de Razilly is to trans-
port himself into those parts with five or six ships well provided, and 800 
soldiers besydes mariners, who may perhaps trench uppon our plantation in 
New England".76 Wake apparently believed at this stage that Razilly was 
bound for Canada rather than for New Scotland, and doubted in any case 
whether the French had any "ill intention". Nevertheless, it was Razilly who 
did eventually go to Acadia as royal lieutenant-general; furthermore, the 
support given by the Company of New France to the La Tours, hitherto on a 
small scale, had taken the more permanent form in late 1631 of the con-
struction of a small fort on the St. John river.77 Thus, had Dorchester been 
able to correlate this development with the reports passed on by Wake, he 
might have been alerted to the possibility that he had underestimated the 
French regard for Acadia. 
The second damaging aspect of Wake's unfortunate isolation lay in the 
eventual terms of the treaty of St-Germain, which were more favourable to 
France than had been envisaged in 1631. Indeed, Charles I on 29 April 1632 
informed Wake through Coke that "though for his own honour, hee will not 
free himself from the disadvantage and burden cast uppon him, by disavowing 
those ministers to whom hee gave his powers, openly to that king and 
state; yet as to yourselves, hee disavoweth both your and Mr. Burlamachis 
[another British agent involved in the negotiations] proceedings as being 
without his Commission or allowance".78 While the principal points enumer-
ated by Coke concerned Canada and not New Scotland, a subtle change had 
been made by Wake in the British position regarding the latter. The British 
understanding in 1631 had been that Port Royal was to be left "waste and 
unpeopled", and a basic distinction had been carefully maintained between 
the removal of the Scots from Port Royal and the restitution of Quebec. In 
the eventual treaty, however, Charles I was obliged "de rendre et restituer 
a Sa Majesté Très Chrestienne, tous les lieulx occupez en la Nouvelle France, 
la Cadie et Canada".79 Moreover, Wake had written from Paris on 9 April to 
"those of Cadie and Port Royal" that they should surrender Port Royal when 
summoned to do so by "Monsr. Razilly, or by some other in his name".'0 This 
76 Wake to Dorchester, 20 January 1632, ibid., ff. 12-3. 
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was clearly a shift from the aim which had been stated, for example, in a 
letter from Alexander, now elevated to the title of Lord Stirling, to the Port 
Royal inhabitants dated 3 December 1631, which envisaged leaving the site in 
the same deserted state as it had been found in 1629.81 The change was not 
necessarily crucial; given the assumption of basic French lack of interest in 
Acadia as such — and Wake was clearly still uncertain as to whether Razilly 
would even be visiting Acadia in person — it was only a matter of words. 
However, it left the Scottish crown without safeguards, and events were to 
show that this mischance would aggravate the results of those miscalculations 
which had already been made. 
The first of these two miscalculations lay in supposing that the colonising 
efforts of 1628-29 could be repeated, as would be necessary if New Scotland 
was to be re-established from another base. A prime difficulty in all colonial 
projects was the mobilization of capital and here the New Scotland colony 
had little potential recourse. The Knights-Baronetcies had never been 
popular, and the withdrawal of the Port Royal colony inevitably generated 
further cynicism. Only thirty-three such titles were conferred from 1631 to 
1638, and by 1639 the order was attracting attention chiefly as a grievance 
which was considered for suppression along with other monopolies.82 
Stirling's personal finances were in chaos, to the degree that after his death 
in 1640 a parliamentary committee was established to administer his debts.83 
Preoccupied with unsuccessful attempts to attain solvency, and not helped 
by a Knight-Baronetcy scheme which was making little progress, Stirling 
clearly lacked the means to make a serious further effort to colonise New 
Scotland, especially if he was to be faced with active French hostility. 
The second basic miscalculation of the Scots crown lay in consistently 
underestimating the importance attached to Acadia by the French. Charles I 
and his advisors had never believed that the French, after the restoration of 
Quebec, would retain a serious commitment to colonise Acadia, and this 
opinion had been confirmed by the negotiators Augier and De Vie. It was 
thought safe enough, therefore, to withdraw from Port Royal and temporarily 
from New Scotland as a whole. This view was soon belied by the power and 
prestige of the French expedition which sailed for Acadia in 1632, a point 
81 Stirling to the Inhabitants of Port Royal, 3 December 1631, CPA, vol. 44, f. 317. 
82 Laing, Royal Letters, Charters and Tracts, pp. 122-3. See also Edmund Rossington to 
Viscount Conway and Killultagh, 23 April 1639 lO.S.l, State Papers (Domestic), SP 16/418, 
no. 41, PRO. 
83 Innes, Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, V, pp. 358, 672. The £10,000 warrant mentioned 
on p. 55 above was apparently never paid to Alexander, no doubt because of the increasing 
financial embarrassment of the crown during the 1630s. Even the payment of this sum, 
however, would certainly have been insufficient to allow Alexander to finance a further 
colonising venture. 
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which was made to the crown in a rather agitated note from Stirling on 16 
June 1632. "It is evident", the note observed, "that the frensch have a desyne 
more than ordinarie herein". In addition to re-establishing "there plantacions 
in Canada", which had been foreseen by the king and Stirling, and "for the 
which there is a reason apparent in the benefite of trade", the French "have 
this yeare sent 300 men to New Scotland". To this unprecedentedly large 
expedition Stirling was inclined to attribute what was, from the Scottish 
standpoint, a sinister purpose: "no present benefite can possiblie redound to 
them in proportion to the charge they are at, and [they] are the nixt yeare as 
I am crediblie informed to sett out Ten shippes with planters these that are 
interested in it haveing bound themselves to a yearlie supplie of a great 
nomber of planters, which is a certaine proofe of some end greater than 
any persons exspectation of proffect can encouradge them unto". Should the 
French "become stronge in New Scotland", Stirling believed, this might well 
prove dangerous not only for New Scotland itself but for the New England 
settlements further south. "The possessing of it [New Scotland] by the 
frensh imediatlie upon the late treatie", he complained, "be not warranted 
by the treatie". According to the interpretation which enjoined the leaving 
of Port Royal "waist and unpeopled", he was right; but the actual terms of the 
treaty had lacked any effective safeguards in the seemingly unlikely event, 
now proved all too real, that the French would send a serious expedition 
to Acadia.84 
Thus, Stirling's note, more than two months after the signing of the treaty 
of St. Germain, reflects his dawning realisation that the Scots had been out-
manoeuvred in the treaty. The first hint that the French had had "a desyne 
more than ordinarie" had come with the selection by Richelieu of Isaac de 
Razilly to take the surrender of Port Royal. Razilly was the most eminent 
French advocate of colonisation, his advice having in 1626 and 1627 been 
instrumental in prompting the formation of the Company of New France. 
Always a strategist, Razilly had noted in his important memorial to Richelieu 
in 1626 that in order to establish New France on a proper footing "il fauldroyt 
borner les Angloys le plus proche qu'on pouroyt".85 Hence, Razilly's nomina-
tion to head the French expedition to Acadia in itself denoted an unusual 
degree of importance and also indicated strategic objectives of the kind which 
Stirling had quite rightly, but belatedly, identified. Moreover, the expedition 
itself was a major one, with an unwonted amount of government participa-
tion. Razilly was granted a fully-equipped warship, the Espérance en Dieu, 
and 10,000 livres, on condition that he and the Company of New France 
would contribute further equipment and men. With these forces, which 
eventually consisted of three ships and three hundred men, Razilly would 
84 "Minute of some points considerable for the King's service", June 1632, CO 1/6, no. 56, PRO. 
85 Léon Deschamps, ed., Mémoire du Chevalier de Razilly (Paris, 1887), p. 32. 
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"mettra en possession au dit Port Royal la dite Compagnie de la Nouvelle 
France". Razilly was intended to remain in Acadia and to develop it as a 
colony, and he was granted by the Company a seigneurie comprising the river 
and bay of Ste. Croix. He was further commissioned to stay in Acadia as the 
royal lieutenant-general in New France. Thus, far from sending a token force 
to save a point of honour, the French had rather made Acadia the head-
quarters of what was at that time their most serious effort so far to develop 
New France.86 
These, then, were the miscalculations which strangled at birth the strategy 
of the Scots crown. How far ought they to have been foreseen, and how far 
do they therefore characterise the strategy itself as an unjustifiable one? In 
the context of general European attitudes to American colonisation, it is hard 
to see the Scots crown as acting with exceptional obtuseness. The problem 
of mobilising capital was one which was consistently underestimated by 
European colonial promoters and was never solved in the generation con-
temporary with Stirling, least of all by Razilly and his successor, d'Aulnay 
Charnisay. The efforts of Razilly and d'Aulnay in Acadia were successful 
in the sense that a community was established first at La Hève, on the At-
lantic coast, and then at Port Royal; but in financial terms, the enterprise 
never paid its way. By 1635, Richelieu himself, though unwilling to commit 
further royal funds, invested 17,000 livres personally in the Razilly Com-
pany in order to relieve the accumulated debts. By the time of d'Aulnay's 
death in 1650, his personal debts arising from colonisation had risen to some 
260,000 livres.87 Sir Ferdinando Gorges, in many ways the English counter-
part of Stirling and Razilly, had similarly been plunged into financial diffi-
culties by the bankruptcy of a colonising attempt in New England between 
1629 and 1634, and in the coming years was to lose much of his effectiveness 
in colonial affairs for this reason.88 While in hindsight it is easy to see that 
Stirling's chances of finding sufficient funds to mount a further colonising 
effort in New Scotland were extremely slight, the miscalculation, rather than 
86 Convention avec le Sieur de Razilly, 27 January 1632, Archives des Colonies, série C11D, 
ff. 47-48, Archives Nationales, Paris; Commission au Sieur de Razilly, 10 May 1632, ibid., 
ff. 50-1; Concession faite à Monsieur le Commandeur de Razilly, 19 May 1632, ibid., ff. 
52-3. See also Trudel, Beginnings, pp. 192-3; Bona Arsenault, Histoire et Généalogie des 
Acadiens (Quebec, 1965), I, pp. 27-8; and Le Blant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la 
Restitution", pp. 82-3. 
87 See Le Blant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la Restitution", pp. 86-7; René Baudry, 
"Charles d'Aulnay et la Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France", Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique 
Française, 11 (1957-58), p. 235; Roger Comeau, "Pêche et Traite en Acadie Jusqu'en 1713" 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ottawa, 1949), pp. 159-60; Trudel, Beginnings, 
pp. 199, 200, 203-4. 
88 See Richard Arthur Preston, "The Laconia Company of 1629: An English Attempt to Inter-
cept the Fur Trade", Canadian Historical Review, 31 (1950), pp. 140-3. 
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being purely a Scottish one, was one which was characteristic of European 
colonisers at this time. 
The outmanoeuvring of Scotland by France in the treaty of St-Germain is 
apparently a different matter altogether. Yet here a European perspective is 
also essential. The decade of the 1620s had seen in northern Europe a some-
what successful effort by such men as Alexander, Razilly and Gorges to relate 
North American colonisation to reasons of state and thus to enlist the support 
of royal influence. While the result in each case had been the formation of a 
large quasi-governmental body to co-ordinate and mobilise resources for 
colonisation, none of these schemes — the Council for New England, the 
order Knight-Baronets of Scotland, and the Company of New France — had 
implied actual royal expenditure on colonies. Insofar as scanty evidence 
permits any explanation of the decision of the French crown not to rely 
exclusively in 1632 upon private financing, this would seem to have been 
prompted by an immediate desire to counter-balance the enormous con-
current population growth of New England.89 Razilly's concern to "borner 
les Angloys", expressed in 1626, had become much more urgent with the 
foundation of the Massachusetts colony in 1629 and its rapid subsequent 
growth. Thus, the nature of Razilly's expedition in 1632 implied a hasty de-
parture from the normal custom of avoiding royal financing of colonial 
developments, and Charles I and Stirling had a right to be surprised. 
Similarly, and for the same strategic purpose of confining the English ex-
pansion, the selection of Acadia, rather than the St Lawrence, as the head-
quarters of New France was an abrupt change of emphasis by the French. 
During the 1620s Acadia had been a small concern indeed, while substantial 
amounts of capital and effort had been devoted to Quebec and the other 
habitations on the St Lawrence. Acadia as such had not been mentioned in 
the articles of association of the Company of New France, and the Company's 
first major act had been to send a fleet to the St Lawrence, where it had been 
captured by the Kirkes. During negotiations in France, the various British 
agents had often reported active French interest in Canada and had rarely 
mentioned any such interest in Acadia except in terms of the personal pride 
of Châteauneuf .90 Even the measures taken in 1630 and 1631 by the Company 
and the French crown to consolidate the allegiance of the La Tours were 
understandably, if incorrectly, interpreted by the Scots as minor efforts to 
prevent collapse of the French presence in Acadia while negotiations were 
in progress.91 There was little reason, therefore, to suppose that the French 
efforts would not be directed in future exclusively to the St Lawrence settle-
89 See Trudel, Beginnings, pp. 192-3. 
90 See, for example, SP 78/86, ff. 159, 273, PRO. 
91 See Le Blant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la Restitution", pp. 76-81. 
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ments which had so readily been restored by the English crown. Had not 
Dorchester's untimely death isolated Wake from the strategic thinking of the 
crown, this miscalculation might have had lesser consequences; but the 
calculation itself had not been unreasonable. 
More generally, the fact was that North American colonies were still a 
very uncertain quantity in Europe. They had recently become recognised 
as the legitimate subject of royal concern, and in 1629-32 had been brought 
into the treaty negotiations with unwonted prominence. Both the French 
and the Scots attached a certain amount of importance to colonies; that 
much was generally known. But as to exactly how much importance, and to 
which particular territories it was attached, these were matters which were 
much more difficult to gauge, and could fluctuate from year to year in any 
European country. In 1629-32, the Scots crown confronted the most strategic-
ally acute of northern European colonial promoters, in the person of Razilly, 
and in Richelieu the statesman who was temporarily — his interest apparently 
faded after Razilly's death in 1635 — the most vigorous implementor of such 
advice.92 It is perhaps not surprising that on this occasion Charles I came 
off worst. 
Some years later, in 1635, Charles I attempted to salvage some hope of 
redeeming the New Scotland project by putting it into the hands of Sir 
Ferdinando Gorges: it is probable that Gorges was intended to take over 
New Scotland in his then-designated capacity of governor of New England.93 
Gorges, however, just as much as Stirling, lacked the means to re-establish 
the New Scotland colony, even if there had been no French presence in 
Acadia, and never in fact went to New England to take up his governorship. 
Stirling, for his part, continued to take an interest in America — in 
January 1635 he and his son became members of the Council for New England, 
and as late as April 1639 he was still hoping that his interests in the beaver 
trade might be a means of rescuing his ruined finances94 — but never again 
attempted to settle a colony. New Scotland had been subsumed into the con-
fusion of English colonial arrangements. When the name was once again 
used, in its Latin form of "Nova Scotia" under Cromwell in 1654, it no longer 
had any distinctive connection with Scotland as such. 
The withdrawal of 1632, therefore, may indeed be seen in retrospect as the 
death-blow to Scottish colonisation in North America.95 It is certainly not the 
92 See Trudel, Beginnings, p. 197. 
93 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 818; Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Secretary Windebank, 31 
March 1635, CO 1/8, no. 52, PRO. 
94 Minutes of the Council for New England, 29 January 1635 [O.S.], CO 1/6, no. 29, p. 18, 
PRO. See also Stirling to Windebank, 1 April 1639 [O.S.], SP 16/417, no. 2, PRO. 
95 Future colonial schemes in East New Jersey and South Carolina were made not through the 
crown of Scotland, but by grant to Scottish proprietors from the crown of England. See 
Insh, Scottish Colonial Schemes, chs. V, VI. 
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purpose of this paper to portray the strategy of Charles I as regards New 
Scotland as anything other than what it was: in practical terms, a disastrous 
failure. What is contended here, however, is that the reasons for the failure 
deserve much more careful attention than they have hitherto been given. To 
attribute the demise of New Scotland to the duplicity, the stupidity or the 
rapacity of Charles is not only grossly to over-simplify and misrepresent, but 
also to deprive the whole episode of its greatest significance for the 
colonial historian. The negotiations of 1629-32, the strategies which were 
employed at that time, and the chance factors which affected them, afford 
the historian a revealing cross-section of European attitudes and actions 
regarding North American colonisation. For the nations of northern Europe, 
colonies had not by 1632 acquired any generally agreed status or value. 
On the contrary, colonisation was still a very recent phenomenon; there was 
room for considerable doubt and debate as to exactly how important it was 
and would become, and consequently as to how much should be committed 
to it in the way of resources, efforts and negotiating weight. The practical 
loss of New Scotland was a setback for Charles I, a personal disaster for 
Stirling, a diplomatic coup for Richelieu, and an opportunity for Razilly. 
For the historian, it is one of the changes which illustrate that fluidity in 
both concept and practice which was so characteristic of early seventeenth-
century European colonisation in North America. 
